(a) In general. - The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives a required element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
(b) Consent to bodily harm. - When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense only if:
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport; or
(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Article 2 of Chapter 3 of this title.
(c) Ineffective consent. - Unless otherwise provided by this Criminal Code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct; or
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of immaturity, mental disease or defect, or intoxication is manifestly unable and known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct; or
(3) It is given by a person whose consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or
(4) It is induced by force, duress or deception.